Freedom and Reason In Kant Essay -- Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Freedom and moderateness in KantMorality, Kant says, can non be regarded as a set of convenings which prescribethe means necessary to the movement of a given end its rules must be obeyedwithout consideration of the consequences that will take in from doing so or not.A principle that presupposes a desired aim as the determinant of the willcannot give rise to a good legality that is, the incorruptity of an act of will cannotbe determined by the count or content of the will for when the will ismaterially determined the question of its religion does not arise.This consideration leads Kant to one of his most important theses. If themoral book of facts of willing is not determined by the content of what is willed,it must be determined by the form If a rational being can trust of his maximsas universal rightfulnesss, he can do so nevertheless by considering them as principles whichcontain the determining ground of the will because of their form and not becauseof their matter. Therefore, the morality of a maxim is determined by itsfunctioning as a universal law, applicable as a general rule to every rationalagent. Since a moral will must be so in virtue of its form alone, the will mustbe assailable of a purely formal determination that is, it must be possible for a creation to act in a certain way for the fix reason that willing in this way isprescribed by a universal law, no matter what the empirical results will be.A will to which moral considerations apply must be, in the strictest sense,a free will, one that can function on an individual basis of the laws of naturalcausality. The concept of morality, therefore, has to be explained in terms of auniversal moral law, and the ability to will in obedience to such a law leads usto postulate the freedom. The freedom which Kant is talking about, is not only anegative freedom consisting in the absence of constraint by empirical causes, itis besides a positive freedom which consists in the ability to bede vil acts of will inaccordance with the moral law, for no other reason than that they are inaccordance with it. Freedom, in this sense, corresponds to Autonomy of the willand its absence ( any(prenominal) situation in which the will is determined by externalcauses ) is called Heteronomy. In obeying the moral law for the sake of the lawalone, the will is autonomous because it is obeying a law which it imposes onitself.... ...e person, as Reason, as belonging to theintellectual world, is not affected by the laws of Determinism he is free. Thisis Kants proof of Freedom. Is it satisfactory?Later on, in the Critics of Practical Reason, Kant does not attempt todeduce synthetically Morality from Freedom, as he tried to do in the Groundingby stating that Freedom was the necessary check up on for Morality, but he assumesthe moral law as a fact of the reason from which he infers Freedom. There havebeen critics blaming Kant of a sort of vicious round, because he seemed todemonstrate Freedom by means of deduction from Morality and then to show the fortuity of the Categorical Imperative deducing it from Freedom. Kant answersthat there is no vicious circle because in the ontological order Freedom is thecondition for Morality ( it is not possible to follow the duty for the duty ifyou are not free), but in the order of our knowledge, the moral law is therequirement for Freedom ( we would not consider ourselves free, if we did not think of ourselves as subject to the moral law). Freedom is the ratio essendi ofthe moral law, but the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of Freedom. Freedom and Reason In Kant Essay -- Philosophy Philosophical EssaysFreedom and Reason in KantMorality, Kant says, cannot be regarded as a set of rules which prescribethe means necessary to the achievement of a given end its rules must be obeyedwithout consideration of the consequences that will follow from doing so or not.A principle that presupposes a desired object as the determina nt of the willcannot give rise to a moral law that is, the morality of an act of will cannotbe determined by the matter or content of the will for when the will ismaterially determined the question of its morality does not arise.This consideration leads Kant to one of his most important theses. If themoral character of willing is not determined by the content of what is willed,it must be determined by the form If a rational being can think of his maximsas universal laws, he can do so only by considering them as principles whichcontain the determining ground of the will because of their form and not becauseof their matter. Therefore, the morality of a maxim is determined by itsfunctioning as a universal law, applicable as a general rule to every rationalagent. Since a moral will must be so in virtue of its form alone, the will mustbe capable of a purely formal determination that is, it must be possible for aman to act in a certain way for the sole reason that willing in this way ispr escribed by a universal law, no matter what the empirical results will be.A will to which moral considerations apply must be, in the strictest sense,a free will, one that can function independently of the laws of naturalcausality. The concept of morality, therefore, has to be explained in terms of auniversal moral law, and the ability to will in obedience to such a law leads usto postulate the freedom. The freedom which Kant is talking about, is not only anegative freedom consisting in the absence of constraint by empirical causes, itis also a positive freedom which consists in the ability to make acts of will inaccordance with the moral law, for no other reason than that they are inaccordance with it. Freedom, in this sense, corresponds to Autonomy of the willand its absence ( any situation in which the will is determined by externalcauses ) is called Heteronomy. In obeying the moral law for the sake of the lawalone, the will is autonomous because it is obeying a law which it impos es onitself.... ...e person, as Reason, as belonging to theintellectual world, is not affected by the laws of Determinism he is free. Thisis Kants proof of Freedom. Is it satisfactory?Later on, in the Critics of Practical Reason, Kant does not attempt todeduce synthetically Morality from Freedom, as he tried to do in the Groundingby stating that Freedom was the necessary condition for Morality, but he assumesthe moral law as a fact of the reason from which he infers Freedom. There havebeen critics blaming Kant of a sort of vicious circle, because he seemed todemonstrate Freedom by means of deduction from Morality and then to show thepossibility of the Categorical Imperative deducing it from Freedom. Kant answersthat there is no vicious circle because in the ontological order Freedom is thecondition for Morality ( it is not possible to follow the duty for the duty ifyou are not free), but in the order of our knowledge, the moral law is therequirement for Freedom ( we would not consi der ourselves free, if we did notthink of ourselves as subject to the moral law). Freedom is the ratio essendi ofthe moral law, but the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of Freedom.